Dr Chris Chaplin explores faith, politics and coalition building in 21st Century Indonesia. 30/07/2024
In February, Indonesia held its fifth consecutive presidential election, with former General Prabowo Subianto emerging as the victor. Despite questions of government neutrality and very real concerns over Prabowo’s human rights record, the election marks the significant staying power of electoral practices. Yet, for the world’s most populous Muslim nation, religion played a relatively minor public role in 2024’s election campaign. This is despite the increasingly vocal use of Muslim majoritarian sentiment in gubernatorial and presidential elections in the previous decade.
But the seeming lack of religious discourse doesn’t imply religion is diminishing in influence. It informs voter preferences, and effects political coalition building. This election was no different. Instead, what has changed from previous elections is an increasingly undemocratic political climate that has made political mobilisation – religious or otherwise – riskier.
Indonesia may seem to be bucking the religious majoritarian trend seen in other large democracies like the US or India, but neither religious convictions nor divisive religious politics have gone away. Rather, the reverse is true. Jokowi’s attempt to neutralise Islamic opponents has only further politicised religious conviction and further embedded religious divisions within political coalitions. For this reason, religious majoritarian politics may seem to be on the wane in Indonesia, but the political environment that gave rise to it remains as potent as ever.
Religious Networks and Political Alliances
Indonesia remains a deeply religious nation with a rich tradition of Islamic scholasticism, Christian denominations, Hindu practices and indigenous faiths. Mosques, churches and temples have historically been important spaces in which social and political messaging have been disseminated, and this remains the case today. Within the age of social media, religious organisations and scholars also have the potential to reach millions, offering potential voters basic information on how to register one’s vote, or the importance of democratic elections.
Unsurprisingly, political candidates go to great lengths to publicise their religious credentials while building formidable alliances with a range of prominent religious figures. Publicly undertaking the Hajj or Umrah (lesser Hajj) or donning religious clothing have become well–trodden parts of a political campaign. So too has the insertion of prominent religious figures within one’s campaign ‘success teams’. Within last February’s election all three prospective presidential candidates recruited networks of religious scholars.
The formation of political–religious alliances is partly transactional. As political scientists have noted, Indonesian democracy is a ‘freewheeling clientelist political system‘ where coalition building takes precedence over the promotion of any programmatic or ideological platform. For politicians, the backing of religious figures or political parties is often a pragmatic attempt to reach as many voters as possible, and the rewards for scholars can include material gains such as greater access to government programmes or influence within the Ministry of Religious Affairs.
A pertinent example of this can be seen within outgoing president (2014–24) Joko Widodo’s alliance with Indonesia’s largest Islamic organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama. Motivated by a need to sure up his Islamic credentials, he selected the prominent Nahdlatul Ulama scholar, Ma’aruf Amin, as his running mate, and has given Nahdlatul Ulama leaders key positions within the Ministry for Religious Affairs.
Augmenting Religious Divides
Few politicians profess to an overt sectarian or religious platform, but their coalitions shape the contours of public religious life. Ever since Indonesia returned to democratic governance over 25 years ago, there has been a lively and contentious debate pertaining to the extent the public sphere should be regulated by religious norms. Legal accusations of blasphemy, which is defined as both an expression of hostility towards a religious group or a ‘deviant interpretation’ of religion, remain common. Meanwhile the Setara Institute on Democracy and Peace cited 329 infringements on religious freedom in 2023 alone.
Such violations are often locally driven but are fuelled by the subtle alliances that take place outside of formal politics. Under the stewardship of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014), conservative Islamic organisations found political backing within their campaigns to enforce religious norms in public or restrict the rights of minority religious communities including Shi’ite and Ahmadi followers. His successor, Joko Widodo appealed to a different array of Islamic and religious actors. Painting himself as a defender of the country’s religious diversity, Joko Widodo worked alongside Nahdlatul Ulama to promote a policy of moderasi beragama (religious moderation) albeit a form of moderation that allowed the government and its allies to controversially dictate what was considered ‘immoderate’ and ‘radical’ religion.
Last February’s presidential election showed how ingrained these divergent attitudes are. Of the three presidential hopefuls, two – Prabowo Subianto and Anies Baswedan – had previously affiliations to Muslim majoritarian supporters. Anies had allied himself to a sectarian campaign within his successful bid to become Jakarta governor in 2017, while Prabowo had gone to great lengths during his 2019 presidential bid to paint the incumbent, Joko Widodo, as anti–Muslim.
But in 2024, Prabowo re–aligned himself with Joko Widodo, even nominating Widodo’s son, Girban Rakabuming, as his vice–presidential candidate. He played down his previous majoritarian credentials, receiving the endorsement of notable Islamic scholars, including Sufi Shaykh Habib Luthfi bin Yayha and Miftah Maulana Hababurrahman (Gus Miftah). Prabowo also solidified support amongst Joko Widodo’s Nahdlatul Ulama allies. This left Anies Baswaden as the preferred majoritarian candidate, giving him the support of socio–conservative figures like Abdul Somad, and the former head of the vigilante Islamic Defenders Front, Rizieq Shihab. Abdul Somad, it should be noted, has over 8.8 million followers on Instagram.
Prabowo’s re–positioning as Jokowi’s ‘legacy’ candidate provided him with a convincing electoral win. It is impossible to specify exactly how religious affiliations influenced voter preference, but it is notable Prabowo won most votes in the Nahdlatul Ulama strongholds of East, and Central Java as well as in Hindu majority Bali, and Christian majority North Sulawesi. These are all provinces that Prabowo has previously lost when he ran for president in 2019.
What does this mean for the future?
As with his predecessors, Prabowo’s victory will have on the religious fabric of Indonesia. His alliance with scholastic networks linked to Joko Widodo implies a degree of continuity, and Nahdlatul Ulama will likely retain its influence within the corridors of power. Yet, this isn’t a certainty. Under Prabowo, Indonesia will almost certainly continue the slide away from democratic and civic rights witnessed under Joko Widodo. In such a climate, Prabowo may rekindle his links to majoritarian scholars should it prove convenient to either balance against other elements within his coalition, or even to undercut his opponents. As it stands, his coalition and vote share give him a wide berth to manoeuvre as he sees fit.
Yet, the religious cleavages that have polarised Indonesian politics are unlikely to go away – even if Prabowo’s priorities will lie with economic growth and infrastructure development. With an election for Jakarta governor scheduled for later this year, we already see prospective candidates and Islamic leaders attempting to build new alliances. Indeed, while clientelism and patronage may continue to define how coalitions are formed, they nonetheless have a profound impact on religious freedom and belief, containing potent but divergent images of what 21st century Indonesia should be.
On Theos’ ‘Religion Counts’ series
This blog is part of a larger body of work including briefing papers and articles exploring the impact of religion on voting patterns in the UK, and worldwide.
Learn more about our Religion Counts work here.
